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Abstract
Many studies demonstrate the social benefits of cooperation. Likewise, recent studies convincingly demonstrate that
betrayal aversion hinders trust and discourages cooperation. In this respect, betrayal aversion is unlike socially ‘‘beneficial’’
preferences including altruism, fairness and inequity aversion, all of which encourage cooperation and exchange. To our
knowledge, other than the suggestion that it acts as a barrier to rash trust decisions, the benefits of betrayal aversion remain
largely unexplored. Here we use laboratory experiments with human participants to show that groups including betrayal-
averse agents achieve higher levels of reciprocity and more profitable social exchange than groups lacking betrayal
aversion. These results are the first rigorous evidence on the benefits of betrayal aversion, and may help future research
investigating cultural differences in betrayal aversion as well as future research on the evolutionary roots of betrayal
aversion. Further, our results extend the understanding of how intentions affect social interactions and exchange and
provide an effective platform for further research on betrayal aversion and its effects on human behavior.
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Introduction
Many studies[1–3] demonstrate the social benefits of coopera-
tion. Likewise, recent studies convincingly demonstrate that
betrayal aversion hinders trust and discourages cooperation
[4–8]. In this respect, betrayal aversion is unlike socially
‘‘beneficial’’ preferences including altruism[9], fairness[10,11]
and inequity aversion[11,12], all of which encourage cooperation
and exchange. To our knowledge, other than the suggestion that it
acts as a barrier to rash trust decisions[13], the benefits of betrayal
aversion remain largely unexplored. Here we use laboratory
experiments with human participants to show that groups
including betrayal-averse agents achieve higher levels of reciproc-
ity and more profitable social exchange than groups lacking
betrayal aversion. These results are the first rigorous evidence on
the benefits of betrayal aversion, and may help future research
investigating cultural differences in betrayal aversion[4,5] as well
as future research on the evolutionary roots of betrayal aversion.
Further, our results extend the understanding of how intentions
affect social interactions and exchange[10] and provide an
effective platform for further research on betrayal aversion and
its effects on human behavior.
A trusting agent (henceforth an ‘‘investor’’) making a decision to
trust a counterpart (henceforth a ‘‘trustee’’) faces uncertainty
beyond that of a monetary risk of a high or a low payment[13–19].
Indeed, trust exposes the investor to the potential emotional cost of
learning that their counterpart betrayed their trust. Aversion to the
latter is known as betrayal aversion[4–9]. Past studies[4–8] show
that, with all else equal, betrayal aversion reduces willingness to
trust. Nevertheless, the research to date has focused only on the
negative aspects of betrayal aversion (i.e., that it appears to be a
factor that hinders beneficial social exchange). This study provides
the first evidence of the adaptive benefits of betrayal aversion.
We use a laboratory trust game experiment[20,21] with human
subjects to test the hypothesis that reciprocation is more frequent
when investors exhibit betrayal aversion. Note that if this is the
case, as our evidence supports, then investors who are known to be
betrayal-averse face relatively more profitable social exchange
opportunities. Consequently, investors lacking betrayal aversion
have an incentive to adopt behavior consistent with that of
betrayal-averse investors, through learning or imitation, to reap
the monetary benefits.
Trustees known to be sympathetic towards betrayal-averse
investors have their own advantage over non-sympathetic trustees
through the social selection process[2]. They are more attractive
exchange partners due to higher rates of reciprocation (see
Supporting Text S1 for model details.) As such, the equilibrium
rates of reciprocation within betrayal-averse groups are expected
to increase over time. This leads to the expected formation of
higher social norm rates of reciprocation, supporting and
bolstering the evolution and success of cooperation. It follows
that groups with betrayal-averse investors are expected to hold an
evolutionary advantage over otherwise equivalent groups lacking
this betrayal-aversion.
Our investigation of the benefits of betrayal aversion begins with
saliently rewarded laboratory trust games[8], as in the binary trust
game illustrated in Figure 1. In these trust games, we randomly
assign subjects to the role of either investor or trustee and then
randomly assign a specific counterpart to the opposite role. The
investor decides whether to split a $10 endowment evenly with
their trustee counterpart ($5 each) or to ‘‘trust’’ the trustee. If the
investor chooses to trust, the $10 triples to $30, and the trustee
chooses from two options: (i) ‘‘reciprocate’’: split the $30 evenly
with the investor ($15 each); or (ii) ‘‘betray’’: split the $30 unevenly
with the investor ($28 to the trustee and $2 to the investor.) This
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once, with only one counterpart. In addition to this baseline trust
game, the KNOW treatment, we review two additional trust game
treatments, the DONTKNOW1 and OPTION treatments (which
appeared previously in Aimone and Houser 2009[8]) that form the
baseline for the current study. We then present a new treatment,
DONTKNOW2, which allows us to study the effect of betrayal
aversion on trustees’ decisions.
In the KNOW treatment, 65.4% of investors choose to trust
their trustee counterpart. We next used a modified trust game,
DONTKNOW1, which removes the risk of emotional disutility
associated with betrayal. In particular, if the investor chooses to
trust, we pay the investor based upon a separate random draw,
without replacement, from the pool of trustee decisions, instead of
payment based upon the decision of their specific counterpart.
Their payment still reveals that either some trustee chose to
reciprocate (if they are paid $15), or that some trustee chose to
betray trust (if they are paid $2). The key manipulation is that the
payment amount no longer reveals whether the investor’s own
counterpart chose to betray trust. Figure 2 shows that
significantly more investors trust in DONTKNOW1 (92.0%,
Mann-Whitney p=0.022) when the emotional risk has been
removed.
We find maximum trust, 100%, to occur in the OPTION
treatment, where investors can choose whether or not to be
exposed to the knowledge of betrayal, and investors have
the option to be paid based upon either their specific
counterpart’s decisions or the random draw from the pool of
trustee decisions.
The results of DONTKNOW1 and OPTION show that
investors are generally willing to assume the monetary risks of a
trust gamble, but many are unwilling to assume the emotional
risks associated with learning their trusted counterpart chose to
betray. Since these treatments are identical from the trustee’s
perspective, we pool trustees’ decisions, observing that 66.3% of
trustees betray trust. At this rate of betrayal, the expected value of
trusting, $6.38, is greater than the safe option, $5.00, making trust
a monetarily profitable venture. When an investor chooses not to
trust, the monetary welfare gains from social exchange are not
realized. As such, the results appear to suggest that societies
without betrayal aversion would have an evolutionary advantage,
due to their relatively greater willingness to engage in profitable
social exchange when exposed to an emotional risk of betrayal.
This is, of course, inconsistent with the presence of betrayal
aversion. To shed light on the adaptive benefits of betrayal
aversion, we conduct a new treatment, the DONTKNOW2
treatment, which examines the effect of betrayal aversion on
trustee behavior.
Results
Our new treatment, DONTKNOW2, is identical to DONT-
KNOW1, aside from the fact that both investors and trustees
know that the exchange environment shields investors from the
knowledge of betrayal, i.e. the institution is common knowledge.
In DONTKNOW2, a trustee’s decision to reciprocate or betray
still has the same expected monetary impact upon each of the
anonymous random counterparts, but a decision to betray no
Figure 1. The Binary Trust Game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017725.g001
Figure 2. Trust by Treatment. Bars indicate the percentage of investors choosing the trust gamble.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017725.g002
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emotions associated with betrayal. Therefore, to an other-
regarding trustee, an act of betrayal is now relatively more
rewarding. The relatively increased rewards could come through
several channels, depending upon the form of other-regarding
preferences of each trustee, but are always tied to the reduction of
emotional disutility associated with betrayal knowledge. For
example, an altruistic trustee, or a guilt-averse trustee[22], would
be more willing to betray since they would know their ‘‘bad’’
action, betrayal, has only expected monetary effects without
disutility associated with an added negative emotional reaction.
Similarly, a change in ‘‘moral wiggle-room’’ [23] could increase
trustees’ willingness to betray only if there was an expected
difference in emotional losses to investors.
A comparison of betrayal in DONTKNOW2 to betrayal in
KNOW, DONTKNOW1, and OPTION (the BASELINE
treatments in Fig. 3) provides a test of whether trustees are averse
to betraying a specific investor counterpart. The 85.3% betraying
in DONTKNOW2 is significantly greater than the 66.3% (MW,
p=0.039) we observed in BASELINE. The results indicate that
trustees are, as hypothesized, more willing to betray when the
investor’s knowledge of betrayal has been removed from the social
exchange environment.
While investors are equally shielded from the knowledge of
personal betrayal in both DONTKNOW1 and DONTKNOW2,
neither treatment shields investors from the monetary risk
associated with the trust gamble. If investors in DONTKNOW2
expect lower rates of reciprocation than investors in DONT-
KNOW1, then we would expect monetary risk aversion to lead to
lower rates of trust from investors in DONTKNOW2 than from
investors in DONTKNOW1. We find that this is indeed the case.
Note that the additional 19% chance of betrayal in DONT-
KNOW2 drops an investor’s expected return from trusting to
$3.91, an expected loss compared to the $5 sure payout of not
trusting. Accordingly, significantly fewer investors trust in
DONTKNOW2, (58.8%) compared to DONTKNOW1 (92.0%;
MW, p=0.005), where investors were also not susceptible to their
betrayal aversion and the expected return of trusting was $6.38.
This difference in rates of trust illustrates that while betrayal
aversion is no longer affecting decision-making, monetary risk
aversion is still affecting decision-making in DONTKNOW1 and
DONTKNOW2.
Discussion
A willingness to cooperate in mutually beneficial social
exchange is a great advantage for groups holding other-regarding
preferences, especially when social exchange requires trust or lacks
beneficial reputation and repeat game effects, as in our one-shot
experiments. Our experiments suggest that betrayal aversion has
duel effects. First, betrayal aversion has a ‘‘negative’’ effect of
reducing investor willingness to trust given an expected rate of
reciprocation. Second, the presence of betrayal-averse agents has a
beneficial effect of interacting with the other-regarding preferences
of trustees to increase rates of reciprocation and cooperation. As a
result, the expected profitability of social exchange requiring trust
is greater in the presence of betrayal-averse agents than without.
The increased expected monetary return in these environments
leads to an increased willingness to engage in social exchange
requiring trust. This, in turn, offsets the decreased willingness to
trust caused by betrayal aversion.
Our results draw attention to the importance of understanding
all sides of a social interaction when investigating intentions, not
just the effects of intentions on response behavior typically
identified by using randomization devices such as computers and
dice[10,16,24]. Trustees, like proposers in ultimatum games who
reduce offers when the likelihood of rejection decreases, consider
not only their own position, but the position of their counter-
part.[25] In our experiment, trustees’ increased willingness to
reciprocate trust in the presence of betrayal-averse agents indicates
that trustees generally anticipate and respond to the expected
negative emotional responses investors have to intentional acts of
betrayal. It is unlikely that betrayal aversion is unique in this
regard. These expectations are particularly important for com-
parative institution studies. Any institutions designed to reduce the
negative effects of betrayal aversion must also be designed to
maintain the beneficial heightened levels of reciprocation also
associated with betrayal aversion[Aimone and Houser, 2010].
This study is a first step in understanding the beneficial side of
betrayal aversion. Future neurological studies can provide
evidence for whether betrayal aversion has genetic foundations,
as suggested by recent research on oxytocin[13], or whether
cultural differences lead to the betrayal aversion differences
observed between countries[4,5]. Additionally, future research
could provide evidence to distinguish between aversion to being
Figure 3. Betrayal by Treatment. Bars indicate the percentage of trustees choosing to betray trust.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017725.g003
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that one’s trust was betrayed, a distinction absent from past studies
of betrayal aversion.
Materials and Methods
This project was approved by the Human Subjects Review
Board of George Mason University. All 228 subjects signed
informed consent prior to participating. Our goal is to create an
experiment that replicates the design of Aimone and Houser
(2009)[8], henceforth ‘‘AH,’’ as precisely as possible, but run the
DONTKNOW treatment in a common knowledge environment.
We explain the AH methods first, and then our extension
treatment. A transcript of the instructions for each treatment can
be found in Supporting Text S2 and S3.
The Trust Decision
The trust game illustrated in Figure 1 (the ‘‘KNOW’’ treatment
in AH) acts as a foundation for the treatments in the experiment. A
human investor (Player 1) and a human trustee (Player 2) make
decisions simultaneously. Each investor decides whether to ‘‘trust,’’
i.e, allow the trustee to choose a division of $30, or not to ‘‘trust,’’
i.e., divide $10 evenly with their trustee counterpart ($5 each.) If
the investor chooses to ‘‘trust’’ then payments are determined by
the trustee’s decision between two options, betrayal or reciproca-
tion. If the trustee chooses to betray the investor’s trust, then the
investor is paid $2 and the trustee $28. However, if the trustee
chooses to reciprocate trust, then the $30 is divided evenly ($15
each.) Note that the game is one-shot, the instructions use neutral
language, and the game tree is not distributed to subjects.
OPTION-TO-KNOW and DONTKNOW1 Treatments
The ‘‘OPTION-TO-KNOW’’ (OPTION) treatment is similar
to KNOW. The instructions inform investors that they have both
a randomly-assigned human counterpart, as well as a randomly-
assigned computer-generated ‘‘decision’’ in the experiment. In
addition to the trust and don’t trust options, each investor also has
a third option to choose to be paid according to the randomly
assigned computer’s decision. In the event the investor chooses the
third option (the computer option), the investor’s counterpart
trustee is paid based upon his/her own decision, just as the trustee
would have been paid in the event the investor chose the trust
option. Since the computer decision is a draw (without
replacement) from a pool identical to that specific session’s pool
of trustees’ decisions, the expected monetary gain or loss to the
investor is also the same whether they choose to payment based on
the computer’s decision or they choose to trust their counterpart
trustee. The difference is that they do not learn whether their
trustee counterpart chose to betray or reciprocate. All investors
complete a quiz over the instructions and procedure before
making their decision (in Supporting Text S2.)
The DONTKNOW1 treatment is identical to the OPTION
treatment with the exception that the investor has only the first
and third options, i.e.., don’t trust or be paid based upon the
computer’s decision. See Supporting Text S2 for the details on
how the computer’s random draw without replacement occurred.
These details are in the instructions as well.
Common Knowledge and Non-Common Knowledge
Procedures
In AH, subjects in the role of investor sat in ‘‘room A’’ and
subjects in the role of trustees sat in a different ‘‘room B.’’ Each
room had an equal number of subjects (say N, which was either
eight or ten) who were seated at visually (but not acoustically)
isolated desks. Subjects received either a ‘‘room A’’ set of
instructions or a ‘‘room B’’ set of instructions respectively. A
monitor in each room read the instructions aloud to the subjects.
All subjects completed a short graded quiz to ensure they
understood their room’s instructions and a monitor read aloud
the questions and answers after all subjects successfully completed
the quiz. Each investor then drew a number (from a box
containing the numbers one through N.) This number, drawn
without replacement, would match them with a specific trustee
counterpart in ‘‘room B’’ who was previously randomly assigned
that number based on where they sat in the lab. In the
DONTKNOW1 and OPTION treatments, this number also
randomly matched the investor with one of the ten computer
decisions also previously randomly assigned a number between 1
and N. After making decisions (as described in the treatment
sections above), subjects filled out a general questionnaire and
were paid in cash privately, immediately before leaving the
laboratory. Note that investors and trustees sat divided into two
rooms, so instructions were not common knowledge.
We implemented the common knowledge version of DONT-
KNOW1 (DONTKNOW2) in the same manner as above by
making only a few changes. First, monitors directed ‘‘room A’’ and
‘‘room B’’ subjects into the same room, instead of two different
rooms. Second, as each subject entered the room, they drew (out
of a common stack) a copy of both the investors’ (‘‘room A’’)
instructions and trustees’ (‘‘room B’’) instructions. One monitor
read aloud the investors’ instructions and a second monitor read
aloud the trustees’ instructions to all subjects (order alternated
between sessions.) Immediately following each set of instructions,
all subjects completed a graded quiz for that set of instructions.
After finishing the graded quiz, a monitor read the questions and
answers for the quiz aloud to all subjects. With these procedures,
both the trustees’ instructions and the investors’ instructions were
common knowledge to all subjects. By making both trustees and
investors take a graded quiz on both sets of instructions (with
answers read aloud to all subjects,) it was common knowledge that
all subjects had a basic understanding of all decisions, instructions,
and procedures at work in the experiment.
Supporting Information
Text S1 Model of Betrayal Aversion.
(DOC)
Text S2 Instructions: Aimone and Houser 2009 Treatments.
(DOC)
Text S3 Instructions: DONTKNOW2 (Common Knowledge)
Treatment.
(DOC)
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